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abstract
We analyse how market price and policy uncertainty, in the form of random provision or
retraction of a subsidy, interact to affect the optimal time of investment and the size of a
renewable energy (RE) project that can be completed in either a single (lumpy investment) or
multiple stages (stepwise investment). The subsidy takes the form of a fixed premium on top
of the electricity price, and, therefore, investment is subject to electricity price uncertainty.
We show that the risk of a permanent retraction (provision) of a subsidy increases (decreases)
the incentive to invest, yet lowers (raises) the amount of installed capacity, and that this
result is more pronounced as the size of the subsidy increases. Additionally, we show that
increasing the number of policy interventions lowers the expected value of a subsidy and
the size of the project. Furthermore, we illustrate that, although an increase in the size of a
subsidy lowers the relative value of the stepwise investment strategy, the expected value of a
lumpy investment strategy is still lower than that of stepwise investment.
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uncertainty
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1. INTRODUCTION
Green investments rely crucially on government support, however, the absence of a clear policy
framework increases uncertainty in revenue streams. This poses a formidable challenge to firms that
must typically determine both the optimal time of investment and the size of a project in the form
of installed capacity. For capital intensive projects, such as renewable energy (RE) power plants,
such decisions entail considerable risk, since, by installing a large capacity, it may not be possible
to recover the investment cost in the case of an unexpected downturn, whereas by installing a small
capacity, revenues could be forgone if market conditions suddenly become favourable. Additionally,
the inability to contract an investment project after its initial installation due to high cost makes
the investment timing and capacity sizing decisions even more crucial. Therefore, we develop an
analytical framework in order to determine how such decisions are affected by price and policy
uncertainty, in the form of random introduction or retraction of a support scheme, assuming that a
project can be completed in either a single or multiple stages. This situation is relevant for both on–
and offshore wind park development, where an area can, and often is, developed in stages. Although
the impact of policy uncertainty on investment decisions has been analysed from the perspective of
carbon prices and the random introduction of a policy scheme (Blyth et al. 2007; Boomsma and
Linnerud 2014), the implications of repeated provisions and retractions of a support scheme on both
the optimal investment timing and capacity sizing decisions as well as the optimal investment strategy
have not been analysed thoroughly yet. Additionally, while stepwise investment is more preferable
than lumpy investment when a firm has discretion over capacity (Chronopoulos et al., 2014), whether
the introduction of a subsidy mitigates this effect remains an open question.
Examples that indicate the impact of policy uncertainty on investment and operational
decisions are increasing as the structural transformation of the power sector continues. For instance,
uncertainty in the introduction of a support scheme delayed more than half of a series of wind power
plants in the UK, that had originally been scheduled for operation by March 2016 (The Telegraph,
2013), as well as a $509 million wind farm by AGL Energy Ltd., Australia’s largest developer of
RE projects (Bloomberg, 2013). Also, in Spain, uncertainty regarding the timing and the size of
the reduction in feed–in–tariffs has increased downside risk considerably for both existing and new
investors (The Economist, 2011). In addition, the absence of a clear policy framework has also
reduced the growth in RE capacity and projections indicate that this reduction will continue over the
next years unless policy uncertainty is reduced (IEA, 2014). Despite the crucial impact of policy
uncertainty on the evolution of RE projects, its implementation in analytical frameworks for stepwise
investment and capacity sizing has been limited, and, therefore, models for predicting the level of RE
investment remain underdeveloped. Indeed, although uncertainties for commodities such as electricity,
natural gas, and oil are reasonably well known, those pertaining to RE technologies, climate change,
and regulatory risk are less well understood. For example, learning curves are necessary to model
efficiency improvements in existing technologies, yet may be less well specified for the development
of RE technologies, that evolve through several stages, and, therefore, their future development path
is likely to be different from their progress in the past (Jamasb and Ko¨hler, 2008). We address this
disconnect by assuming that a firm has discretion over both the time of investment and the size of
the project and that it can adopt a lumpy or a stepwise investment strategy in the light of random
provision or retraction of a support scheme. The latter takes the form of a fixed premium on top of the
electricity price, and, as a result, the firm is subject to electricity price uncertainty as is the case with
one of the widely implemented support schemes, namely premium feed–in tariff.
This policy mechanism has been introduced, for example, in Spain and Portugal, yet, after
the financial crisis, tariff levels have been subject to frequent reductions at random points in time. In
turn, this has had crucial implications for the viability of private firms. For example, Iberdrola, Spain’s
biggest power group, reported a 13% decline in profits following a reform of the energy sector that
aimed at reducing the tariff deficit (Financial Times, 2014a). Such tariff cuts were also implemented
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in Portugal, as part of the wider cuts in financial support affecting all electricity producers, in order to
reduce the deficit in the generation sector (Wind Power, 2012). Similarly, subsidy cuts in the UK for
solar photovoltaic may not only delay the point at which solar could be cost competitive, but also
damage broader investor confidence and affect the progress with both deployment and cost reductions
(The Guardian, 2015a). Consequently, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we develop
an analytical framework for stepwise investment under price and policy uncertainty. Second, we
analyse how price and policy uncertainty interact to affect the optimal investment timing and capacity
sizing decisions as well as the relative value of the two investment strategies, i.e., stepwise and lumpy.
Finally, we provide managerial and policy insights based on analytical and numerical results. More
specifically, we illustrate how the random provision or retraction of a subsidy impacts not only the
time of investment and the size of a project, but also the choice of investment strategy, in terms of
lumpy versus stepwise investment. Thus, we derive insights on how policies may be designed not
only to incentivise investment in RE projects but also to ensure that the level of investment promotes
the viability of decarbonisation targets.
We proceed in Section 2 by discussing some related work. In Section 3, we introduce
assumptions and notation and formulate the investment problem under each strategy, i.e., lumpy and
stepwise investment, as an optimal stopping–time problem. In Section 4, we analyse the benchmark
case of investment and capacity sizing without policy uncertainty and then extend it in Sections 5.1
and 5.2 by allowing for the sudden retraction or provision of a subsidy, respectively. In Section 5.3,
we analyse the case of sudden provision of a retractable subsidy, and, in Section 5.4, we allow for
infinite provisions and retractions. Section 6 provides numerical examples for each case and illustrates
the interaction between price and policy uncertainty in order to enable more informed investment,
capacity sizing, and policy decisions. Section 7 concludes the paper and offers directions for further
research.
2. RELATEDWORK
Despite the extensive literature that illustrates the amenability of real options theory to the energy
sector (Lemoine, 2010; Rothwell, 2006), analytical formulations of problems that address investment
in RE projects typically do not combine crucial features such as policy uncertainty, discretion over
capacity, or flexibility for stepwise investment. An empirical approach for analysing the impact of
regulatory risk on investment in generation facilities is presented in Walls et al. (2007). They consider
regulatory uncertainty with respect to both the timing and pace of restructuring of electricity markets,
and find that power plant investment is higher in states that have restructured electricity markets than
in states that have taken no restructuring actions. Additionally, they find that greater uncertainty
increases the incentive to choose power plant types with lower capital to generating capacity ratios.
Blyth et al. (2007) and Kettunen et al. (2011) analyse how a firm’s investment propensity is affected
by uncertainty in carbon prices. The former find that carbon price uncertainty creates a risk premium
for power generation and that the option to retrofit CCS may accelerate investment in a coal power
plant, while the latter use a multistage stochastic optimization model and demonstrate how real
options valuation yields substantially different results regarding investment propensities compared to
conventional economic analysis.
Linnerud et al. (2014) examine how uncertainty in the introduction of RE certificates affects
the timing of investments. Their results indicate that while investors with a portfolio of licences act in
line with real options theory, i.e., policy uncertainty delays investment rates, investors with a single
license act in line with the traditional NPV approach. Boomsma and Linnerud (2014) analyse how
investment incentives are affected by the likely termination or revision of a support scheme allowing
for electricity and subsidy prices to follow correlated geometric Brownian motions. Their results
indicate that, expectations that a support scheme may be terminated, delay investment if it is applied
retroactively, but may facilitate investment otherwise. While the aforementioned papers address
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the impact of various forms of policy uncertainty on a firm’s propensity to invest, they ignore both
discretion over capacity as well as the flexibility for stepwise investment.
Examples of early work in the area of sequential investment include Majd and Pindyck
(1987), who show how traditional valuation techniques understate the value of a project by ignoring
the flexibility embedded in the time to build, and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), who develop a sequential
investment framework assuming that the project value depreciates exponentially and the investor
has an infinite set of investment options. The value of modularity and sequential investment is
emphasised in Gollier et al. (2005) and Malchow–Møller and Thorsen (2005). The former show
that the option value of modularity may trigger investment in the initial module at a level below the
now–or–never NPV, while the latter illustrate how the investment policy resembles the simple NPV
rule under repeated investment options. More recently, Siddiqui and Maribu (2009) analyse how
sequential investment in distributed generation capacity may reduce the exposure of a microgrid to
risk from natural gas price volatility and find that the microgrid prefers a direct (stepwise) investment
for low (high) levels of volatility. By contrast, Kort et al. (2010) show that higher price uncertainty
makes a lumpy investment more attractive relative to a stepwise investment strategy by increasing the
reluctance to make costly switches between stages, yet Chronopoulos et al. (2014) show how this
result does not hold if a firm has discretion over capacity. Siddiqui and Takashima (2013) extend
the symmetric, non–pre–emptive duopoly of Goto et al. (2008) by allowing for sequential capacity
expansion in order to explore how sequential decision making offsets the effect of competition. While
sequential investment is a crucial feature of RE projects, the scope of these papers is limited as they
ignore capacity sizing and policy uncertainty.
Analytical models for investment and capacity sizing decisions include Dangl (1999), who
analyses how demand uncertainty impacts the decision to invest in a project with continuously scalable
capacity, and shows that, even when demand is high, low uncertainty makes waiting for further
information the optimal strategy. Bøckman et al. (2008) adopt a similar approach for valuing small
hydropower projects that are subject to electricity price uncertainty, while Huisman and Kort (2009)
examine the same problem in monopoly and duopoly settings and show how a leader can use discretion
over capacity strategically in order to deter a follower’s entry temporarily. Relaxing the assumption
of risk neutrality, Chronopoulos et al. (2012) show how risk aversion facilitates investment by
increasing the incentive to build a smaller project. A policy–oriented model that allows for capacity
sizing is presented by Boomsma et al. (2012), who analyse investment behavior under fixed and
premium feed–in tariffs (FIT), RE certificate trading, and changes of a support scheme via Markov
switching. They find that the choice of support scheme and any corresponding uncertainty has a
crucial impact on both the timing and the size of an investment. However, by modelling subsidy prices
via a Markov–modulated geometric Brownian motion, the implications of permanent or temporary
termination of a support scheme on investment timing and capacity sizing decisions are not taken into
accounted.
More pertinent to our analysis is the working paper of Adkins and Paxson (2013), who
analyse investment in a RE facility allowing for uncertainty in the price of electricity and the quantity
of electricity produced, as well as policy uncertainty in the form of the random provision or retraction
of a subsidy that is proportional to the quantity of electricity produced. They consider the case in
which a subsidy may be either retracted or provided permanently at a random point in time, as well as
the case in which a subsidy may be introduced and then retracted permanently. In each case, they find
that investment thresholds increase with greater quantity uncertainty and decrease with the size of
the subsidy, thus implying that either production volume floors or high subsidies might encourage
investment. Additionally, the value of the option to invest decreases with greater quantity uncertainty
and increases as the correlation between the price of electricity and quantity of electricity produced
increases, since this raises the aggregate volatility. Although we do not consider quantity uncertainty,
we assume that a firm faces price and policy uncertainty and apart from discretion over the investment
strategy, i.e., lumpy versus stepwise, it also has discretion over both the time of investment and
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the size of the project. We find that the likely provision of a subsidy lowers the relative value of
the two strategies, yet stepwise investment still dominates a lumpy investment strategy even when
the size of the subsidy increases. Additionally, in line with Boomsma and Linnerud (2014), we
show how a retractable subsidy may facilitate investment relative to the case where the subsidy is
available permanently, yet lowers the optimal capacity of a project. Moreover, we find that the sudden
provision of a permanent subsidy may delay investment relative to the case in which the subsidy is
never available, yet raises the amount of installed capacity. Finally, an increasing number of policy
interventions facilitates investment and lowers the amount of installed capacity.
3. MODEL
We consider a price–taking firm that holds a perpetual option to invest in a project of infinite lifetime
facing both price and policy uncertainty. The firm has the option to either exercise an investment
option immediately or delay investment as well as the flexibility to invest in either a single or a
sequence of i discrete stages, with i ∈ N. Policy uncertainty takes the form of the random provision
or retraction of a subsidy, that is implemented as a fixed proportion y on top of the electricity price.
We let ζ ∈ {0, 1} indicate the presence (ζ = 1) or absence (ζ = 0) of a subsidy, while m and n denote
the number of retractions and provisions, respectively. Also, we assume that t ≥ 0 is continuous
and denotes time and that policy uncertainty is modelled via a Poisson process {Mt, t ≥ 0}, which is
defined in (1)
Mt =
∑
d≥1
1{t≥Td } (1)
where Td =
∑d
ξ=1 hξ and
{
hξ , ξ ≥ 1
}
is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random
variables, with hξ ∼ exp(λ). Hence, Mt counts the number of policy interventions that occur between
0 and t, and hξ is the time interval between subsequent policy interventions. Thus, if no policy
intervention has occurred for t years, then, with probability λdt, it will occur within the next short
time interval dt, i.e:
dMt =
{
1 ,with probability λdt
0 ,with probability 1 − λdt
We assume that the variable production cost is zero and that the long–term electricity price
at time t, Et (in $/MWh), is independent of {Mt, t ≥ 0} and follows a geometric Brownian motion
(GBM) that is described in (2) (Boomsma et al., 2012). We denote by µ the annual growth rate, by σ
the annual volatility, and by dZt the increment of the standard Brownian motion. Also, ρ > µ is the
subjective discount rate.
dEt = µEtdt + σEtdZt, E0 ≡ E > 0 (2)
The capacity of the project in the now–or–never investment case is denoted by K
( j )
ζ,m,n
(in
MWh) and by K ( j )
ζ,m,n
(in MWh) if the firm can delay investment. Also, F
( j )
ζ,m,n
(·) (in million $) is
the expected value of a now–or–never investment opportunity, where j ∈ {`, si } (denoting lumpy
and staged investment, respectively), while k
( j )
ζ,m,n
(in MWh) is the corresponding optimal capacity.
For example, F
(` )
1,1,0 (·) denotes the expected NPV for a lumpy investment when a subsidy is present
(ζ = 1) but may be retracted permanently (m = 1, n = 0) at a random point in time and k
(` )
1,1,0 is the
corresponding optimal capacity. If the option to defer investment is available, then F ( j )
ζ,m,n
(·) (in
million $) denotes the maximised option value, while τ( j )
ζ,m,n
, ε
( j )
ζ,m,n
, and k ( j )
ζ,m,n
, denote the time of
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
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investment, the optimal investment threshold, and the corresponding optimal capacity, respectively.
The investment cost, I (·) (in $), is indicated in (3), where γ j > 1 implies that I (·) is a convex
function of the capacity, and, consequently, this model is more suitable for describing projects that
exhibit diseconomies of scale, e.g., RE power plants. Indeed, the convexity of the investment cost
encapsulates the combined impact of features, such as maintenance cost, wake effects, etc., that cause
the marginal investment cost to increase with greater capacity (NREL, 2012; Coulomb and Neuhoff,
2006).
I
(
K
( j )
ζ,m,n
)
= a jK
( j )
ζ,m,n
+ bjK
( j )
γ j
ζ,m,n
, a j , bj > 0 and γ j > 1 (3)
Finally, we assume that stepwise investment is more costly than lumpy investment although each stage
is less costly than the entire project, as indicated in (4).
I
(
K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
<
∑
i
I
(
K
(si )
ζ,m,n
)
and I
(
K
(si )
ζ,m,n
)
< I
(
K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
,∀i (4)
The firm’s optimisation objective is summarised in (5), where the outer maximisation
indicates the firm’s decision on whether to invest immediately or delay investment. The first argument
of the maximisation indicates that when the firm decides to wait for a small time interval dt, then the
value it holds is the discounted expected value of the capital appreciation of the investment opportunity.
The second argument represents the value that the firm receives when exercising a now–or–never
investment opportunity and indicates that the firm will choose the capacity of the project so that it
maximises its expected NPV at investment.
F
( j )
ζ,m,n
(E) = max
(1 − ρdt)EE
[
F
( j )
ζ,m,n
(E + dE)
]
, max
K
( j )
ζ,m,n
[
F
( j )
ζ,m,n
(
E, K
( j )
ζ,m,n
)]  (5)
If we denote by R( j )
ζ,m,n
≡ R
(
E
( j )
ζ,m,n
, K
( j )
ζ,m,n
)
the instantaneous revenue of an active project, then the
expected value of a project under lumpy investment is described in Figure 1. Notice that the firm can
postpone investment until τ(` )
ζ,m,n
, at which point it must fix the capacity, K (` )
ζ,m,n
, of the entire project.
Consequently, K (` )
ζ,m,n
is a function of the electricity price at time τ(` )
ζ,m,n
.
E
(` )
ζ,m,n
, K
(` )
ζ,m,n
ﬀ
∫ ∞
τ
(` )
ζ,m,n
e−ρtR(` )
ζ,m,n
dt − I
(
K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
· · ·
-
τ
(` )
ζ,m,n
0
•
t
Figure 1: Lumpy investment
Subject to the optimal capacity choice at investment, i.e., the inner maximisation in (5), the firm’s
optimisation objective when investment is deferred is described in (6).
F
(` )
ζ,m,n
(E) = sup
τ
(` )
ζ,m,n
∈S
EE
∫ ∞
τ
(` )
ζ,m,n
e−ρtR
(
E
(` )
ζ,m,n
, K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
dt − I
(
K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
(6)
Using the law of iterated expectations and the strong Markov property of the GBM, we can rewrite (6)
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as in (7), where the stochastic discount factor EE
[
e−ρτ
( j )
ζ,m,n
]
=
(
E
E
( j )
ζ,m,n
)β1
and β1 > 1, β2 < 0 are
the roots of the quadratic 12σ
2 β(β − 1) + µβ − ρ = 0.
F
(` )
ζ,m,n
(E) = sup
τ
(` )
ζ,m,n
∈S
EE
[
e−ρτ
(` )
ζ,m,n
]
E
E (` )ζ,m,n
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR
(
E
(` )
ζ,m,n
, K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
dt − I
(
K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)]
= max
E
(` )
ζ,m,n
≥E
*, EE (` )ζ,m,n +-
β1 
R
(
E
(` )
ζ,m,n
, K
(` )
ζ,m,n
)
ρ − µ − I
(
K
(` )
ζ,m,n
) (7)
Next, we consider a stepwise investment strategy, and, without loss of generality, we assume
that it comprises of two stages. As indicated in Figure 2, the firm must fix the capacity, K (
s1 )
ζ,m,n
, of the
first stage at τ(
s1 )
ζ,m,n
. Then, it operates the first stage of the project until τ(
s2 )
ζ,m,n
, at which point it invests
in the second stage and fixes the corresponding capacity, K (
s2 )
ζ,m,n
. Once the firm invests in the second
stage, it incurs the corresponding cost and receives revenues from both stages.
E
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
, K
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
E
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
, K
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
ﬀ · · ·ﬀ -
∫ τ(s2 )ζ,m,n
τ
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
e−ρtR
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
dt − I
(
K
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
) ∫ ∞
τ
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
e−ρt
∑
i
R
(si )
ζ,m,n
dt − I
(
K
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
)
-
τ
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
0
•
τ
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
•
t
Figure 2: Stepwise investment
Notice that the option to invest in the first stage may be seen as a compound option, since, by
completing the first stage, the firm receives the option to proceed to the second. From Kort et al.
(2010), we know that we can express the investment option as two independent optimal stopping–time
problems, as in (8)
F
(s)
ζ,m,n
(E) = sup
τ
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
∈S
EE

∫ ∞
τ
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
e−ρtR
(
E
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
, K
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
)
dt − I
(
K
(s1 )
ζ,m,n
)
+ sup
τ
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
≥τ(s1 )
ζ,m,n
EE

∫ ∞
τ
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
e−ρtR
(
E
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
, K
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
)
dt − I
(
K
(s2 )
ζ,m,n
) (8)
and, therefore, F (s)
ζ,m,n
(E) =
∑
i F
(si )
ζ,m,n
(E), where the expression for the value of the option to invest in
each stage is indicated in (9).
F
(si )
ζ,m,n
(E) = max
E
(si )
ζ,m,n
≥E
*..,
E
E(
si )
ζ,m,n
+//-
β1 
R
(
E
(si )
ζ,m,n
, K
(si )
ζ,m,n
)
ρ − µ − I
(
K
(si )
ζ,m,n
) (9)
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4. BENCHMARK CASE: INVESTMENTWITHOUT POLICY UNCERTAINTY
Here, we assume that the subsidy is already either provided (ζ = 1) or retracted (ζ = 0) permanently.
Initially, the firm ignores the option to wait for more information and invests in the project immediately.
Thus, it must first solve the inner maximisation in (5). The expected value of the now–or–never
investment opportunity under lumpy ( j = `) and stepwise investment ( j = si ) for ζ ∈ {0, 1} is
indicated in (10), where 1 is the indicator function. Note that the analysis of lumpy and stepwise
investment follows the same steps, and, therefore, it is presented in a single framework.
F
( j )
ζ,0,0
(
E, K
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
=
EK
( j )
ζ,0,0
(
1 + y1{ζ=1}
)
ρ − µ − I
(
K
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
(10)
Since, at investment, E is known, the firm needs to determine only the corresponding optimal capacity.
By maximising (10) with respect to K ( j)
ζ,0,0 , we obtain the optimal capacity, k
( j)
ζ,0,0 , when the firm invests
immediately, as indicated in (11).
max
K
( j )
ζ,0,0
F
( j )
ζ,0,0
(
E, K
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
⇒ k
( j )
ζ,0,0 (P) =

1
bj γ j
*.,
E
(
1 + y1{ζ=1}
)
ρ − µ − a j
+/-

1
γ j −1
(11)
Next, we assume that the firm can defer investment. The value of the option to invest under
lumpy or stepwise investment is obtained by solving the optimal stopping–time problem (12).
F
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E) = max
E
( j )
ζ,0,0 ≥E
*, EE ( j )ζ,0,0 +-
β1 
E
( j )
ζ,0,0K
( j )
ζ,0,0
(
1 + y1{ζ=1}
)
ρ − µ − I
(
K
( j )
ζ,0,0
) (12)
The solution to the unconstrained optimisation problem (12) is described in (13). The endogenous
constant, A( j )
ζ,0,0 , the optimal investment threshold, ε
( j )
ζ,0,0 , and the corresponding optimal capacity, k
( j )
ζ,0,0 ,
are determined via value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches of (13)
together with the condition for optimal capacity choice at investment (11) and are indicated in (A–3),
(A–4), and (A–5), respectively (all proofs can be found in the appendix).
F
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E) =

A
( j )
ζ,0,0E
β1 , for E < ε ( j )
ζ,0,0
Ek
( j )
ζ,0,0 (1+y1{ζ=1})
ρ−µ − I
(
k
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
, for E ≥ ε ( j )
ζ,0,0
(13)
As Proposition 1 indicates, the presence of a permanent subsidy increases the incentive to invest and
reduces the optimal investment threshold. However, compared to the case where the subsidy is not
available, the size of the project remains unaffected. This happens because the subsidy lowers the
optimal investment threshold, and, in turn, the corresponding optimal capacity. Intuitively, while a
subsidy raises the expected value of the now–or–never investment opportunity, the optimal investment
threshold when investment is deferred decreases, thereby lowering the expected project value at
investment. Consequently, when evaluating the expected NPV of the project at the optimal investment
threshold in the presence of a subsidy, these two opposing forces cancel and the optimal capacity
remains unaffected. Notice that, although the cost premium associated with a stepwise investment
strategy creates a discrepancy between the quantitative results for lumpy and stepwise investment, the
analytical results of Proposition 1 hold for j = `, si .
Proposition 1 ε ( j )1,0,0 < ε
( j )
0,0,0 and k
( j )
1,0,0 = k
( j )
0,0,0 .
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5. INVESTMENT UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY
5.1 Retractable Subsidy
We extend the previous framework by assuming that a subsidy is available but may be retracted
permanently at a random point in time. The expected NPV of the project in the absence (ζ = 0) or
presence (ζ = 1) of a subsidy is indicated in (10). Hence, since the likelihood of subsidy retraction
within an infinitesimal time interval dt is λdt, the expected value of the now–or–never investment
opportunity in the presence of a retractable subsidy is indicated in (14). Notice that λ = 0 implies that
the subsidy will never be retracted, however, a greater λ raises the likelihood of subsidy retraction and
lowers the expected value of the now–or–never investment opportunity.
F
( j )
1,1,0
(
E, K
( j )
1,1,0
)
=
EK
( j )
1,1,0
[
1 + (1 − λ)y]
ρ − µ − I
(
K
( j )
1,1,0
)
(14)
By maximising (14) with respect to K
( j )
1,1,0 , we obtain the optimal capacity, k
( j )
1,1,0 , when investing
immediately, as indicated in (15).
max
K
( j )
1,1,0
F
( j )
1,1,0
(
E, K
( j )
1,1,0
)
⇒ k
( j )
1,1,0 (E) =
[
1
bj γ j
(
E(1 + (1 − λ)y)
ρ − µ − a j
)] 1
γ j −1
(15)
Next, we assume that the firm has the option to delay investment. As indicated in (16), within
an infinitesimal time interval dt, the subsidy may be retracted with probability λdt and the firm will
receive the option F ( j )0,0,0 (E), which is described in (13) for ζ = 0. However, with probability 1 − λdt
no policy intervention will take place and the firm will continue to hold the option F ( j )1,1,0 (E).
F
( j )
1,1,0 (E) = (1 − ρdt)
[
λdtEE
[
F
( j )
0,0,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1 − λdt)EE
[
F
( j )
1,1,0 (E + dE)
] ]
(16)
By expanding the right–hand side of (16) using Itô’s lemma, we obtain an ordinary differential
equation which we can be solve in order to obtain F ( j )1,1,0 (E). Since the incentive to invest under a
retractable subsidy is greater compared to the case in which the subsidy is absent permanently, we
have ε ( j )1,1,0 ≤ ε
( j )
0,0,0 , and, therefore, the expression for F
( j )
0,0,0 (E) must be taken from the top part of (13).
The value of the option to invest under a lumpy or a stepwise investment strategy is indicated in (17),
where ε ( j )1,1,0 , k
( j )
1,1,0 , and B
( j )
1,1,0 > 0 are determined numerically via value–matching and smooth–pasting
conditions together with condition (15) for optimal capacity choice at investment, while δ1 > 1, δ2 < 0
are the roots of the quadratic 12σ
2δ(δ − 1) + µδ − (ρ + λ) = 0. The first term on the top part of (17)
is the value of the option to invest in the permanent absence of a subsidy, however, since the subsidy
is temporarily present, the first term must be adjusted via the second term. The bottom part of (17)
represents the expected NPV of the project.
F
( j )
1,1,0 (E) =

A
( j )
0,0,0E
β1 + B
( j )
1,1,0E
δ1 , E < ε
( j )
1,1,0
Ek
( j )
1,1,0 [1+(1−λ)y]
ρ−µ − I
(
k
( j )
1,1,0
)
, E ≥ ε ( j )1,1,0
(17)
As indicated in Proposition 2, the presence of a retractable subsidy increases the incentive to invest
compared to the case in which a subsidy is not available, thus lowering the optimal investment
threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity. Interestingly, the likelihood of subsidy retraction
facilitates investment compared to the case in which a subsidy is available permanently when λ is low.
Intuitively, the threat of subsidy retraction increases the incentive to invest in order to take advantage
of the subsidy for a longer period.
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Proposition 2 λ ≥ 0⇒ ε ( j )1,1,0 ≤ ε
( j )
0,0,0 and k
( j )
1,1,0 ≤ k
( j )
0,0,0 , while, for low values of λ, ε
( j )
1,1,0 ≤ ε
( j )
1,0,0 .
Furthermore, the likelihood of subsidy retraction lowers the expected option value compared to the
case in which a subsidy is available permanently. As shown in Proposition 3, for λ = 0 the subsidy
will never be retracted, and, therefore, the relative loss in option value is zero. As λ increases, the
relative loss increases, since B( j )1,1,0E
δ1 → 0⇒ F ( j )1,1,0 (E) → F
( j )
0,0,0 (E). Notice that the relative loss in
option value will always be below one, since the firm can invest even in the absence of a subsidy.
Proposition 3
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )−F
( j )
1,1,0 (E )
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )
∈
0,
A
( j )
1,0,0−A
( j )
0,0,0
A
( j )
1,0,0
+-.
5.2 Sudden Provision of a Permanent Subsidy
Here, we assume that a subsidy is not available but may be provided permanently at a random point
in time. The provision of a subsidy may be required in order to support green investments, as the
increasing replacement of fossil–fuel with RE facilities can result in the deterioration of the financial
risk–return performance metrics for incremental investments (Mun˜oz and Bunn, 2013). The expected
NPV of the project in the presence (ζ = 1) or absence (ζ = 0) of a subsidy is described in (10). Hence,
by taking into account the likelihood of subsidy provision, the expected value of the now–or–never
investment opportunity is indicated in (18)
F
( j )
0,0,1
(
E, K
( j )
0,0,1
)
=
EK
( j )
0,0,1 (1 + λy)
ρ − µ − I
(
K
( j )
0,0,1
)
(18)
and, by maximising (18) with respect to K
( j )
0,0,1 , we obtain the optimal capacity, k
( j )
0,0,1 , which is described
in (19). Contrary to (14), λ = 0 now implies that the subsidy will never be provided, while an
increase in λ raises the likelihood of subsidy provision, and, in turn, both the expected value of
the now–or–never investment opportunity and k
( j )
0,0,1 . By comparing (19) to (11) for ζ = 1, we find
that k
( j )
0,0,1 < k
( j )
1,0,0 . Hence, the optimal capacity under a now–or–never investment decision is lower
when the provision of the subsidy is uncertain compared to the case in which the subsidy is available
permanently, since the expected NPV of the project is lower.
max
K
( j )
0,0,1
F
( j )
0,0,1
(
E, K
( j )
0,0,1
)
⇒ k
( j )
0,0,1 (E) =
[
1
bj γ j
(
E(1 + λy)
ρ − µ − a j
)] 1
γ j −1
(19)
Next, we assume that investment can be deferred. As indicated in (20), within a short time
interval dt a subsidy may be provided with probability λdt, and, thus, the firm will receive the
option F ( j )1,0,0 (E), which is indicated in (13) for ζ = 1. However, with probability 1 − λdt no policy
intervention will take place and the firm will continue to hold the option F ( j )0,0,1 (E).
F
( j )
0,0,1 (E) = (1 − ρdt)
[
λdtEE
[
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1 − λdt)EP
[
F
( j )
0,0,1 (E + dE)
] ]
(20)
By expanding the right–hand side of (20) using Itô’s lemma, we obtain an ordinary differential
equation which can be solved for F ( j )0,0,1 (E). Notice that F
( j )
0,0,1 (E) is defined over three different regions
of E. If E < ε ( j )1,0,0 , then, even if a subsidy becomes available, the firm would still have to wait until
E = ε
( j )
1,0,0 in order to invest. Hence, the first term on the top part of (21) is the option to invest in the
presence of a permanent subsidy, however, since the subsidy is not available yet, this term must be
adjusted via the second term. Next, if ε ( j )1,0,0 ≤ E ≤ ε
( j )
0,0,1 , then investment will take place immediately
if a subsidy is provided, and, therefore, the first two terms in the middle part of (21) reflect the project’s
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expected revenues and cost, respectively. The third term corresponds to the probability of investment
if the subsidy is not provided and the last term reflects the probability that the price will drop below
ε
( j )
1,0,0 . Finally, if E ≥ ε
( j )
0,0,1 , then investment will take place immediately.
F
( j )
0,0,1 (E) =

A
( j )
1,0,0E
β1 + B
( j )
0,0,1E
δ1 , E < ε
( j )
1,0,0
λEk
( j )
0,0,1 (1+y)
(ρ+λ−µ)(ρ−µ) −
λI
(
k
( j )
0,0,1
)
ρ+λ + C
( j )
0,0,1E
δ1 + D
( j )
0,0,1E
δ2 , ε
( j )
1,0,0 ≤ E ≤ ε
( j )
0,0,1
Ek
( j )
0,0,1 (1+λy)
ρ−µ − I
(
k
( j )
0,0,1
)
, E ≥ ε ( j )0,0,1
(21)
The endogenous constants B( j )0,0,1 , C
( j )
0,0,1 , D
( j )
0,0,1 , the optimal investment threshold, ε
( j )
0,0,1 , and the
corresponding optimal capacity, k ( j )0,0,1 , are obtained numerically via value–matching and smooth–
pasting conditions between the three branches of (21) together with the condition for optimal capacity
choice at investment, which is indicated in (19). Notice that the temporary absence of the subsidy
lowers the value of the project. Consequently, as shown in Proposition 4, the optimal investment
threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity when the subsidy is likely to be provided are greater
than in the permanent presence of a subsidy. Interestingly, in the light of subsidy provision investment
is delayed relative to the case in which the subsidy is never provided for low values of λ. Intuitively,
the likelihood of a permanent subsidy increases the incentive to build a bigger project, which raises
the optimal investment threshold.
Proposition 4 λ ≥ 0⇒ ε ( j )0,0,1 ≥ ε
( j )
1,0,0 and k
( j )
0,0,1 ≥ k
( j )
1,0,0 , while, for low values of λ, ε
( j )
0,0,1 ≥ ε
( j )
0,0,0 .
Unlike the case of sudden subsidy retraction, the relative loss in option value due to policy uncertainty,
which is indicated in Proposition 5, decreases with greater λ. Indeed, for λ = 0 the subsidy will never
be provided and the relative loss in option value is maximised, as F ( j )0,0,1 (E) = F
( j )
0,0,0 (E), whereas, it
decreases with greater λ, since the expected value of the project increases.
Proposition 5
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )−F
( j )
0,0,1 (E )
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )
∈
−
B
( j )
1,0,0
A
( j )
1,0,0
, 0+-.
5.3 Sudden Provision of a Retractable Subsidy
Unlike Section 5.2, the sudden provision of a subsidy is now followed by a potential permanent
retraction. Therefore, once a subsidy is provided, the firm receives the expected value of a project
under a retractable subsidy, which is already determined in (14). By contrast, if the subsidy is not
provided, then the firm will hold the value of a project in the absence of a subsidy. Given the likelihood
of these two outcomes, the expected value of the active project under sudden provision of a retractable
subsidy is described in (22). Notice that, compared to (18), the subsidy will be available for a smaller
time period, and, therefore, its expected value is reduced, i.e., λ(1 − λ)y < λy.
F
( j )
0,1,1
(
E, K
( j )
0,1,1
)
=
EK
( j )
0,1,1
[
1 + λ (1 − λ) y]
ρ − µ − I
(
K
( j )
0,1,1
)
(22)
By maximising (22) with respect to K
( j )
0,1,1 , we obtain the optimal capacity, k
( j )
0,1,1 , which is indicated in
(23). By comparing (23) to (19), we see that k
( j )
0,1,1 < k
( j )
0,0,1 , since the reduction in the value of the
subsidy creates an incentive to install a smaller project.
max
K
( j )
0,1,1
F
( j )
0,1,1
(
E, K
( j )
0,1,1
)
⇒ k
( j )
0,1,1 =
[
1
bj γ j
(
E(1 + λ(1 − λ)y)
ρ − µ − a j
)] 1
γ j −1
(23)
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Next, we determine the value of the option to invest when investment is deferred. As
indicated in (24), within a short time interval dt a subsidy may be provided with probability λdt, and,
thus, the firm will receive the option F ( j )1,1,0 (E), which is described in (17). However, with probability
1 − λdt no policy intervention will take place and the firm will continue to hold the option F ( j )0,1,1 (E).
F
( j )
0,1,1 (E) = (1 − ρdt)
[
λdtEE
[
F
( j )
1,1,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1 − λdt)EE
[
F
( j )
0,1,1 (E + dE)
] ]
(24)
By expanding the right–hand side of (24) using Itô’s lemma, we obtain an ordinary differential
equation which can be solved for F ( j )0,1,1 (E). The expression for F
( j )
0,1,1 (E) is indicated in (25), where
C
( j )
0,1,1 , D
( j )
0,1,1 , G
( j )
0,1,1 , ε
( j )
0,1,1 , and k
( j )
0,1,1 , are obtained numerically via value–matching and smooth–pasting
conditions between the branches of (25) together with (23). Notice that, unlike (21), the extra term
on the top part of (25) reflects the reduction in the expected option value due to subsidy retraction.
Next, if ε ( j )1,1,0 ≤ E ≤ ε
( j )
0,1,1 , then investment will take place immediately if a subsidy is provided and
the first two terms in the middle part of (25) reflect the project’s expected profit. The third term, is the
probability of investment if the subsidy is not provided and the last term reflects the probability that
the price will drop below ε ( j )1,1,0 . Finally, if E ≥ ε
( j )
0,1,1 , then investment will take place immediately
even in the absence of a retractable subsidy.
F
( j )
0,1,1 (E) =

A
( j )
0,0,0E
β1 + B
( j )
1,1,0E
δ1 + C
( j )
0,1,1E
δ1 , E < ε
( j )
1,1,0
λEk
( j )
1,1,0 [1+(1−λ)y]
(ρ+λ−µ)(ρ−µ) −
λI
(
k
( j )
1,1,0
)
ρ+λ + D
( j )
0,1,1E
δ1 + G
( j )
0,1,1E
δ2 , ε
( j )
1,1,0 ≤ E < ε
( j )
0,1,1
Ek
( j )
0,1,1 (1+λ(1−λ)y)
ρ−µ − I
(
k
( j )
0,1,1
)
, E ≥ ε ( j )0,1,1
(25)
As it will be illustrated numerically, the likelihood of permanent retraction after the subsidy is provided
reduces the amount of installed capacity compared to the case of permanent subsidy provision, i.e.,
k
( j )
0,1,1 < k
( j )
0,0,1 . This happens because the likelihood of subsidy retraction decreases the expected value
of the project, thereby increasing the incentive to install a smaller capacity.
5.4 Infinite Provisions and Retractions
Here, we assume that a subsidy can be retracted or provided infinitely many times. In this case, policy
uncertainty in the form of extra provisions and retractions does not affect the value of the active
project. Indeed, even after several policy interventions have taken place, there still remain infinite
provisions and retractions. Taking into account that λ (1 − λ(1 − λ ... = ∑∞i=0(−1)iλi = 11+λ , the
expected value of the active project when ζ = 0 is indicated in (26)
EK
( j )
0,∞,∞
ρ − µ
[
1 + yλ (1 − λ(1 − λ... ] − I (K ( j )0,∞,∞ ) = EK
( j )
0,∞,∞
ρ − µ
[
1 +
λy
1 + λ
]
− I
(
K
( j )
0,∞,∞
)
(26)
whereas for ζ = 1 the expected value of the active project is indicated in (27).
EK
( j )
1,∞,∞
ρ − µ
1 + y *,1 −
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i+1λ i +-
 − I
(
K
( j )
1,∞,∞
)
=
EK
( j )
1,∞,∞
ρ − µ
[
1 +
y
1 + λ
]
− I
(
K
( j )
1,∞,∞
)
(27)
Consequently, the optimal capacity of the project when exercising a now–or–never investment
opportunity is obtained by maximising (26) and (27) with respect to K
( j )
0,∞,∞ and K
( j )
1,∞,∞ , respectively.
With the option to defer investment, the value of the option to invest for ζ = 0 is described in
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(28), where η is the positive root of the quadratic 12σ
2x(x − 1) + µx − (ρ + 2λ) = 0.
F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E) =

A
( j )
a
E
β1 − A( j )
b
E
η
, E < ε
( j )
1,∞,∞
λEk
( j )
0,∞,∞ (1+
y
1+λ )
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ−µ) − λρ+λ I
(
k
( j )
0,∞,∞
)
+D
( j )
0,∞,∞E
δ1 + G
( j )
0,∞,∞E
δ2 , ε
( j )
1,∞,∞ < E < ε
( j )
0,∞,∞
Ek
( j )
0,∞,∞
ρ−µ
1+λ+λy
1+λ − I
(
k
( j )
0,∞,∞
)
, E ≥ ε ( j )0,∞,∞
(28)
Also, the value of the option to invest for ζ = 1 is described in (29). The endogenous constants A( j )
a
,
A
( j )
b
, D( j )0,∞,∞ , and G
( j )
0,∞,∞ , as well as ε
( j )
ζ,∞,∞ and k
( j )
ζ,∞,∞ are determined numerically via value–matching
and smooth–pasting conditions between the three branches of (28) and the two branches of (29).
F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) =

A
( j )
a
E
β1 + A
( j )
b
E
η
, E < ε
( j )
1,∞,∞
Ek
( j )
1,∞,∞
ρ−µ
1+λ+y
1+λ − I
(
k
( j )
1,∞,∞
)
, E ≥ ε ( j )1,∞,∞
(29)
6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
For the numerical examples we assume that µ = 0.01, ρ = 0.1, σ ∈ [0.1, 0.4], b` = bs1 = bs2 = 0.5,
a` = 30, as1 = 15, as2 = 25, γ` = γs1 = γs2 = 3, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the parameter values
satisfy assumption (4), i.e., the stepwise investment is more costly than the lumpy investment strategy.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of λ on the optimal investment threshold and the corresponding optimal
capacity in the case of sudden subsidy retraction. Without loss of generality, the impact of λ on
the optimal investment threshold and optimal capacity under staged investment is omitted in order
to improve the clarity of the graphs, since it is qualitatively similar. Notice that if λ = 0, then the
subsidy will never be retracted, and, as a result, ε (` )1,1,0 = ε
(` )
1,0,0 . However, for low values of λ, the
optimal investment threshold decreases as the likelihood of retraction increases and ε (` )1,1,0 ≤ ε
(` )
1,0,0 , as
shown in Proposition 2. This happens because the firm wants to take advantage of the subsidy for a
longer period and the extra incentive to invest increases as the expected time until retraction decreases.
However, beyond a certain high value of λ the subsidy is very likely to be retracted and the extra
investment incentive decreases. Indeed, if λ = 1, then ε (` )1,1,0 = ε
(` )
0,0,0 and k
(` )
1,1,0 = k
(` )
0,0,0 , i.e., the optimal
investment threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity are the same as in the case in which
a subsidy is not available. As the right panel illustrates, k (` )1,0,0 = k
(` )
0,0,0 , i.e., the permanent presence
or absence of a subsidy does not impact the optimal capacity, as shown in Proposition 1, while, if
λ > 0, then k (` )1,1,0 < k
(` )
ζ,0,0 . Additionally, the impact of λ on ε
(` )
1,1,0 and k
(` )
1,1,0 becomes more pronounced
as the level of the subsidy increases, since this raises the firm’s incentive to invest. Hence, in order to
incentivise investment, policymakers should announce a potential subsidy retraction while allowing
for a sufficient time interval so that firms can still invest and take advantage of the subsidy. Otherwise,
investment will be delayed relative to the case in which the subsidy is always available. The effect of
this policy is that it may accelerate investment, yet the amount of installed capacity will be lower.
As the left panel in Figure 4 illustrates, the relative loss in option value due to subsidy
retraction, which is described in Proposition 3, increases as the likelihood of subsidy retraction
increases. Nevertheless, this result is less pronounced with greater price uncertainty. In fact, the
impact of price uncertainty on the relative loss in option value is more pronounced when λ high.
Intuitively, greater price uncertainty raises the optimal capacity of the project, thereby making the
loss in option value due to subsidy retraction less pronounced. According to the right panel, although
both greater price uncertainty and a greater subsidy lower the relative value of the two strategies,
F
(s)
1,1,0 (E)/F
(` )
1,1,0 (E), they do not present a significant incentive to adopt a lumpy over of a stepwise
investment strategy. This is in line with Chronopoulos et al. (2014), who show that stepwise
investment dominates the lumpy investment strategy when a firm has discretion over capacity.
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Figure 3: Impact of the likelihood of sudden and permanent subsidy retraction on the optimal
investment threshold (left) and the optimal capacity (right) for y = 0.1, 0.15 and σ = 0.2. Greater
likelihood of permanent subsidy retraction increases the incentive to invest, yet lowers the amount of
installed capacity by decreasing the expected value of the subsidy.
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Figure 4: Relative loss in option value due to subsidy retraction versus λ (left) and relative value of the
two strategies (lumpy and stepwise investment) versus σ for λ = 0.1 (right). The relative loss in option
value increases as the retraction of the subsidy becomes more likely. Also, stepwise investment
dominates a lumpy investment strategy, although the incentive to invest in stages decreases with either
greater price uncertainty or as the level of the subsidy increases.
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Figure 5 illustrates the impact of λ on the optimal investment threshold and the corresponding
optimal capacity in the case of sudden provision of a permanent subsidy. Notice that if λ = 0, then the
subsidy will never be provided, and, as a result, ε (` )0,0,1 = ε
(` )
0,0,0 . Also, when the likelihood of subsidy
provision is small, the incentive to delay investment increases with greater λ and ε (` )0,0,1 ≥ ε
(` )
0,0,0 , as
shown in Proposition 4. Indeed, greater λ raises the expected value of the project, and, in turn, the
incentive to increase the amount of installed capacity. However, beyond a certain high value of λ the
extra incentive to delay investment decreases, and, for λ = 1 we have ε (` )0,0,1 = ε
(` )
1,0,0 and k
(` )
0,0,1 = k
(` )
1,0,0 .
Intuitively, greater λ lowers the likelihood of an inaccurate capacity choice, and, in turn, the extra
incentive to delay investment. Consequently, while the installation of larger projects brings the
industry closer to decarbonisation targets, the expected time until investment is justified moves further
into the future, as the optimal investment threshold increases. With this in mind, policymakers should
weigh the benefits from the installation of bigger projects against the cost of postponed investment in
designing both the level of the subsidy as well as the expected time at which it should be provided.
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Figure 5: Impact of the likelihood of sudden provision of a permanent subsidy on the optimal
investment threshold (left) and the optimal capacity (right) for y = 0.1, 0.15 and σ = 0.2. Greater
likelihood of subsidy provision raises the expected value of the subsidy, and, in turn, the incentive to
install a bigger project, yet delays investment by increasing the optimal investment threshold.
The left panel in Figure 6 illustrates the impact of λ on the relative loss in option value due
to uncertainty in the provision of the subsidy, which is described in Proposition 5. Notice that, as λ
increases, the likelihood of subsidy provision increases, and, as a result, the relative loss in option
value converges to zero. Like in the case of sudden subsidy retraction, greater price uncertainty lowers
the relative loss in option value and this result is more pronounced when the likelihood of subsidy
provision is low. As the right panel illustrates, the relative value of the two strategies decreases as
price uncertainty and the level of the subsidy increase, nevertheless, the stepwise investment strategy
dominates that of lumpy investment.
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of λ on the optimal investment threshold and the corresponding
optimal capacity in the case of sudden provision of a retractable subsidy. Notice that, compared to the
case of sudden provision of a permanent subsidy, the likely retraction of the subsidy after its initial
provision reduces the expected value of the project, and, in turn, lowers both the optimal investment
threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity. More specifically, the optimal investment threshold
(left panel) and the corresponding optimal capacity (right panel) are greater than in the case of sudden
subsidy retraction, yet lower than in the case of sudden subsidy provision. Consequently, as the
number of policy interventions increases, a firm may have a greater incentive to invest but the amount
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of installed capacity decreases. Hence, although an increasing number of policy interventions may be
inevitable, it is, nevertheless, possible to design a policy in a way that not only facilitates investment
but also raises the amount of installed capacity compared to the case in which the subsidy is never
available.
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Figure 6: Relative loss in option value due to policy uncertainty versus λ (left) and relative value of the
two strategies (lumpy and stepwise investment) versus σ for λ = 0.1 (right). Greater likelihood of
subsidy provision lowers the relative loss in option value by raising the expected value of the subsidy.
Also, stepwise investment dominates a lumpy investment strategy, although this becomes less
pronounced as either price uncertainty or the level of the subsidy increases.
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Figure 7: Impact of the likelihood of sudden provision of a retractable subsidy on the optimal
investment threshold (left) and the optimal capacity (right) for σ = 0.2. Increasing number policy
interventions lowers the expected value of the subsidy, thereby reducing the amount of installed capacity,
and, in turn, the incentive to postpone investment.
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As illustrated on the left panel of Figure 8, the optimal investment threshold exhibits a
similar non–monotonic behaviour with greater λ under infinite provisions and retractions for ζ = 0, 1.
More specifically, if ζ = 1, then the optimal investment threshold is greater compared to the case of
permanent subsidy retraction. This happens because the expected value of the subsidy, and, in turn,
the value of the project is greater, which, in turn, raises both the incentive to build a bigger project and
the optimal investment threshold. Similarly, for ζ = 0 and under infinite provisions and retractions,
the expected value of the project, and, in turn, the optimal investment threshold are greater compared
to the case of provision of a retractable subsidy, yet lower compared to the case of permanent subsidy
provision. Also, as the right panel illustrates, an increasing number of policy interventions lowers the
expected value of the subsidy, thereby increasing the firm’s incentive to invest in stages.
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Figure 8: Impact of policy uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold for σ = 0.2 (left) and
relative value of the two strategies (lumpy and stepwise investment) versus σ for λ = 0.1 (right). Under
infinite provisions and retractions, policy uncertainty and investment timing exhibit a non–monotonic
relationship similar to the case of finite policy interventions. Also, increasing number of policy
interventions raises the relative value of the stepwise investment strategy, thereby mitigating the impact
of a greater subsidy.
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of price uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold and
the corresponding optimal capacity in the case of sudden provision of a permanent subsidy and under
infinite provisions and retractions for ζ = 0. Notice that higher price uncertainty delays investment
by increasing the opportunity cost of investing and raising the value of waiting. Also, increasing
policy interventions facilitate investment, yet lower the amount of installed capacity. Interestingly,
however, the total amount of installed capacity via a stepwise investment strategy is greater than that
under lumpy investment. This happens because the endogenous relationship between the electricity
price at investment and the size of the project allows the firm to compensate for the extra cost it
incurs for the flexibility to invest in stages by adjusting the size of the project so that it offsets the
reduction in the value of the investment opportunity (Chronopoulos et al., 2014). This has crucial
implications for both policymakers and private firms. Indeed, the former must take into account how
policy uncertainty interacts with a firm’s ability to respond to a reduction in the expected value of a
project through managerial flexibility, e.g., discretion over capacity. Similarly, the latter can exploit
the flexibility to scale the capacity of the project in order to offset any extra cost associated with either
stepwise investment or policy uncertainty.
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Figure 9: Optimal investment threshold (left) and optimal capacity (right) versus σ for λ = 0.1. The
flexibility to invest in stages entails a cost premium, which may delay investment relative to the lumpy
investment strategy, however, discretion over capacity enables the firm to offsets the extra cost by
installing a bigger project.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The future development of RE technologies relies crucially on government support, however, frequent
changes and revisions of support schemes in combination with price uncertainty complicate investment
and operational decisions. As the structural transformation of the power sector continues, it is expected
to result in substantial changes in the wholesale market dynamics and will have crucial implications for
both market participants and policymakers (Sensfuß et al., 2008). In fact, empirical research based on
the UK power market has indicated that a ceteris paribus increasing replacement of commodity–based
with RE facilities may cause a deterioration of the financial risk–return performance metrics for
incremental investments. Consequently, unlike conventional degression trajectories, RE projects
may require a progressively higher level of support over time, as they entail high risk and low return
(Mun˜oz and Bunn, 2013). Fluctuating commodity prices may also contribute to this, as decreasing
oil prices increase the attractiveness of commodity–based over RE facilities. Notable examples of
companies that suffered a, at least temporary, share price fall due to the collapse of oil prices include
Vestas, the world’s largest wind turbine supplier, Tesla Motors, the US electric carmaker, and the solar
panel giant, Yingli Green Energy (Financial Times, 2014b). Within this environment, private firms
are required to make accurate investment and capacity sizing decisions, while policymakers must take
into account how private firms respond to price and policy uncertainty in order to incentivise green
investment decisions.
Therefore, we develop an analytical framework in order to investigate how price and policy
uncertainty interact in order to affect the optimal investment timing and capacity sizing decisions
assuming that investment can proceed in either a single or multiple stages. Thus, we obtain insights
on the combined impact of price and policy uncertainty on both the investors’ propensity to invest as
well as on the level of investment. We assume that price uncertainty is described via a GBM and
implement policy uncertainty by allowing for the random introduction or retraction of a subsidy, that
takes the form of a fixed proportion on top of the price of electricity. Results indicate that, in the
absence of policy uncertainty the optimal investment threshold is lower when the subsidy is available
permanently, yet the corresponding optimal capacity is the same as in the case where the subsidy
is not available. Furthermore, the likelihood of sudden provision or retraction of a subsidy has a
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non–monotonic impact on both the optimal investment threshold and the corresponding optimal
capacity. More specifically, the threat that a subsidy may be retracted permanently increases the
incentive to invest in order to take advantage of the subsidy for a longer period, however, this lowers
the amount of installed capacity.
By contrast, the likelihood of provision of a permanent subsidy raises the incentive to install
a bigger project, yet this delays investment as the optimal investment threshold increases. In addition,
we illustrate how increasing number of policy interventions lowers the size of the project. Moreover,
the sudden provision of a subsidy lowers the relative value of the two investment strategies, yet the
stepwise investment strategy dominates lumpy investment. In fact, increasing number of policy
interventions raises the relative value of the stepwise investment strategy, and, although a greater
subsidy makes the impact of policy uncertainty on investment and capacity sizing decisions more
pronounced, it does not impact the choice of investment strategy. This implies that, if a firm has
discretion over capacity, then the stepwise investment strategy dominates lumpy investment under
both price (Chronopoulos et al., 2014) and policy uncertainty, in the form of random provision and
retraction of a subsidy.
These results imply that policymaking decisions may become more efficient if they take into
account the opposing forces emerging from the interaction between the different types of uncertainties
and a firm’s flexibility over not only investment timing and capacity sizing decisions, but also over the
choice of investment strategy. Inclusion of such features in the policymaking process may alleviate the
complexity underlying the design and implementation of policies for supporting green investments,
in terms of the timing of policy interventions and how this influences the risk–return profile of RE
projects (The Guardian, 2015b; The Telegraph, 2015). For example, despite the attractiveness of
announcing the permanent retraction of a subsidy in terms of accelerating investment, policymakers
should consider the implications of a smaller project, as indicated in the left panel of Figure 3.
Similarly, the provision of a permanent subsidy may result in a bigger project, however, as indicated
in the left panel of Figure 5, this postpones investment by raising the required investment threshold.
More importantly, in the case of sequential policy interventions, the non–monotonic impact of policy
uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold and the optimal capacity implies a flexibility from a
policymaking perspective, in terms of balancing the timing of investments and the size of RE projects.
Indeed, as the left panel of Figure 7 indicates, the rate of policy interventions may be adjusted to
facilitate the progress of green investments by either promoting bigger projects that take longer to be
realised or by accelerating investment in smaller projects. Additionally, although it may be feasible to
promote lumpy over stepwise investment by increasing the size of the subsidy when a firm does not
have discretion over project scale, this is not the case when the capacity of the RE project is scalable.
Indeed, a ceteris paribus increase in the subsidy raises the value of the lumpy investment strategy,
as it is relatively cheaper than stepwise investment. However, with discretion over capacity, a firm
compensates for the extra cost associated with the flexibility to proceed in stages by increasing the
amount of installed capacity (Chronopoulos et al., 2014), and, thus, in contrast to Siddiqui and Maribu
(2009) and Kort et al. (2010), stepwise investment always dominates a lumpy investment strategy.
A limitation of this work is that it assumes that the electricity price is independent of the
size of the project. This limitation is particularly obvious when the installation of a very large project
is optimal. In order to relax this assumption, we can allow the electricity price to depend on the
size of the project via an inverse demand function (Dangl, 1999). This will not only facilitate the
analysis of economies of scale, i.e., γ j < 1, but will also enable further insights on the impact of
policy uncertainty on the total level of investment and how much lower it is relative to the benchmark
case of no policy uncertainty. Directions for further research may also include the implementation of
a different stochastic process, e.g., mean–reverting process or arithmetic Brownian motion, in order to
relax the assumption of a GBM. Moreover, our setup also allows for game–theoretic considerations,
and, therefore, it would be interesting to include strategic interactions via duopolistic competition
and analyse how the presence of a rival may impact investment and capacity sizing decisions as
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well as the choice of investment strategy. This will provide further insights on how policy measures
may enhance or reduce the competitive advantage of power plants depending on their asymmetries
related to cost and operational flexibility. For example, a carbon–price floor can influence the value
of operational flexibility, thereby inducing investment in a RE facility by decreasing the value of
operational flexibility embedded in a commodity–based facility (Chronopoulos et al., 2014).
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APPENDIX
INVESTMENTWITHOUT POLICY UNCERTAINTY
The value of the option to invest in the presence (ζ = 1) or absence (ζ = 0) of a subsidy is described
in (A–1).
F
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E) =

(1 − ρdt)EE
[
F
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E + dE)
]
, E < ε
( j )
ζ,0,0
Ek
( j )
ζ,0,0 (1+y1{ζ=1})
ρ−µ − I
(
k
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
, E ≥ ε ( j )
ζ,0,0
(A–1)
By expanding the first branch on the right–hand side of (A–1) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the
differential equation for F ( j )
ζ,0,0 (E), which, together with its solution for E < ε
( j )
ζ,0,0 , is indicated in
(A–2).
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
( j )′′
ζ,0,0 (E) + µPF
( j )′
ζ,0,0 (E) − ρF
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E) = 0 ⇒ F
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E) = A
( j )
ζ,0,0E
β1 + C
( j )
ζ,0,0E
β2 (A–2)
Note that the value of the project becomes very small as E → 0. Since β2 < 0, we have
E → 0 ⇒ C ( j )
ζ,0,0E
β2 → ∞. Consequently, C ( j )
ζ,0,0 = 0, and, thus, the expression for F
( j )
ζ,0,0 (E) is
indicated in (13). By applying value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two
branches of (13), we obtain the expression for the endogenous constant, A( j )
ζ,0,0 , and the optimal
investment threshold, ε ( j )
ζ,0,0 .
A
( j )
ζ,0,0 =
1
ε
( j )
β1
ζ,0,0

ε
( j )
ζ,0,0 k
( j )
ζ,0,0
(
1 + y1{ζ=1}
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ρ − µ − I
(
k
( j )
ζ,0,0
) (A–3)
ε
( j )
ζ,0,0
(
k
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
=
I
(
k
( j )
ζ,0,0
)
k ( j )
ζ,0,0
(
1 + y1{ζ=1}
) β1(ρ − µ)
β1 − 1 (A–4)
Finally, by inserting (A–4) into (11) we obtain the expression for the optimal capacity.
k
( j )
ζ,0,0 =
[ a j
bj
1
γ j (β1 − 1) − β1
] 1
γ j −1
, γ j (β1 − 1) − β1 > 0 (A–5)
Moreover, from (A–5) we see that the existence of an optimal solution to the investment problem
requires that the cost function is strictly convex, i.e., γ j (β1 − 1) − β1 > 0⇔ γ j > β1β1−1 > 1.
Proposition 1 ε ( j )1,0,0 < ε
( j )
0,0,0 and k
( j )
1,0,0 = k
( j )
0,0,0 .
Proof: In the presence of a subsidy, the value of the option to invest is indicated in (13). The
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value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two branched of (13) are:
A
( j )
1,0,0ε
( j )β1
1,0,0 =
ε
( j )
1,0,0 k
( j )
1,0,0 (1 + y)
ρ − µ − I
(
k
( j )
1,0,0
)
(A–6)
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(A–7)
The expression for the endogenous constant, A( j )1,0,0 , and the optimal investment threshold, ε
( j )
1,0,0 , is
indicated in (A–8).
A
( j )
1,0,0 =
ε
( j )
1−β1
1,0,0 k
( j )
1,0,0 (1 + y)
β1(ρ − µ) and ε
( j )
1,0,0
(
k
( j )
1,0,0
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(
k
( j )
1,0,0
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β1
β1 − 1 (A–8)
Notice that ε ( j )1,0,0 = ε
( j )
0,0,0/(1 + y) and that by inserting the expression for ε
( j )
1,0,0 into (11) we obtain:
k
( j )
1,0,0
(
ε
( j )
1,0,0
)
=

1
bj γ j
*.,
ε
( j )
1,0,0 (1 + y)
ρ − µ − a j
+/-

1
γ j −1
= k
( j )
0,0,0
(
ε
( j )
0,0,0
)
(A–9)
INVESTMENT UNDER A RETRACTABLE SUBSIDY
First, we determine the expected value of the active project in the presence of a retractable subsidy.
Notice that, within an infinitesimal time interval dt, either the subsidy will be retracted with probability
λdt and the instantaneous revenue will decrease by EK ( j )1,1,0 y, or no policy intervention will take place
with probability 1− λdt and the reduction in the instantaneous revenue will be zero. Consequently, the
expected reduction in the instantaneous revenue over a small time interval dt is λEK ( j )1,1,0 ydt and the
expected present value of this reduction is
λEK
( j )
1,1,0y
ρ−µ . By subtracting this from the expected revenues
under a permanent subsidy,
EK
( j )
1,1,0 (1+y)
ρ−µ , we obtain the expected value of the revenues under sudden
subsidy retraction, i.e.,
EK
( j )
1,1,0 [1+(1−λ)y]
ρ−µ .
Proposition 2 λ ≥ 0⇒ ε ( j )1,1,0 ≤ ε
( j )
0,0,0 and k
( j )
1,1,0 ≤ k
( j )
0,0,0 , while, for low values of λ, ε
( j )
1,1,0 ≤ ε
( j )
1,0,0 .
Proof: The value of the option to invest in the presence of a retractable subsidy is indicated in (17). No-
tice that λ = 0⇒ F ( j )1,1,0 (E) = F
( j )
1,0,0 (E), and, therefore, ε
( j )
1,1,0 = ε
( j )
1,0,0 < ε
( j )
0,0,0 and k
( j )
1,1,0 = k
( j )
1,0,0 = k
( j )
0,0,0 .
From (15), we know that λ ↗⇒ k
( j )
1,1,0 ↘, which implies that a higher λ lowers the expected value of
the project, and, in turn, both the amount of installed capacity and the optimal investment threshold.
Hence, for small values of λ, ε ( j )1,1,0 ≤ ε
( j )
1,0,0 , whereas λ → 1⇒ ε
( j )
1,1,0 → ε
( j )
0,0,0 .
Proposition 3
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )−F
( j )
1,1,0 (E )
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )
∈
0,
A
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1,0,0−A
( j )
0,0,0
A
( j )
1,0,0
+-
Proof: In the presence of a retractable subsidy, the value of the option to invest is:
F
( j )
1,1,0 (E) = A
( j )
0,0,0E
β1 + B
( j )
1,1,0E
δ1 , E < ε
( j )
1,1,0 (A–10)
If λ = 0, then the subsidy will never be retracted. This implies that F ( j )1,1,0 (E) = F
( j )
1,0,0 (E), and, in turn,
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that the relative loss in option value is zero. By contrast, as λ increases, the likelihood of subsidy
retraction increases, and, as a result, B( j )1,1,0E
δ1 → 0, and, in turn, F ( j )1,1,0 (E) → A
( j )
0,0,0E
β1 , which implies
that the relative loss in option value is
A
( j )
1,0,0−A
( j )
0,0,0
A
( j )
1,0,0
.
INVESTMENT UNDER SUDDEN PROVISION OF A PERMANENT SUBSIDY
The extra instantaneous revenue from subsidy provision is EK ( j )0,0,1 y and will be realised with probability
λdt, whereas with probability 1 − λdt, no subsidy will be provided. Hence, the expected value of
the subsidy is λEK ( j )0,0,1 ydt and its expected present value is
λEK
( j )
0,0,1y
ρ−µ . Consequently, the expected
value of the revenues under sudden provision of a permanent subsidy consist of the expected revenues
without the subsidy,
EK
( j )
0,0,1
ρ−µ , and the extra revenues due to the subsidy,
λEK
( j )
0,0,1y
ρ−µ , i.e.,
EK
( j )
0,0,1 (1+λy)
ρ−µ .
Proposition 4 λ ≥ 0⇒ ε ( j )0,0,1 ≥ ε
( j )
1,0,0 and k
( j )
0,0,1 ≥ k
( j )
1,0,0 , while, for low values of λ, ε
( j )
0,0,1 ≥ ε
( j )
0,0,0 .
Proof: The value of the option to invest under sudden provision of a permanent subsidy is indicated
in (21). Notice that λ = 0 ⇒ F ( j )0,0,1 (E) = F
( j )
0,0,0 (E), and, therefore, ε
( j )
0,0,1 = ε
( j )
0,0,0 > ε
( j )
1,0,0 and
k
( j )
0,0,1 = k
( j )
0,0,0 = k
( j )
1,0,0 . As λ increases, the likelihood of subsidy provision increases, thereby raising
the expected value of the project, and, in turn, the incentive to install greater capacity. Indeed,
λ ↗ ⇒ k
( j )
0,0,1 ↗, and, therefore, at low values of λ we have ε
( j )
0,0,1 ≥ ε
( j )
0,0,0 . By contrast, at high
values of λ it is very likely that the subsidy will be provided, and, therefore, λ → 1⇒ ε ( j )0,0,1 → ε
( j )
1,0,0 .
Proposition 5
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )−F
( j )
0,0,1 (E )
F
( j )
1,0,0 (E )
∈
−
B
( j )
1,0,0
A
( j )
1,0,0
, 0+-.
Proof: Under sudden provision of a permanent subsidy, the value of the option to invest is:
F
( j )
0,0,1 (E) = A
( j )
1,0,0E
β1 + B
( j )
0,0,1E
δ1 , E < ε
( j )
1,0,0 (A–11)
If λ = 0, then the subsidywill never be provided. This implies that F ( j )0,0,1 (E) =
(
A
( j )
1,0,0 + B
( j )
0,0,1
)
Eβ1 , and,
in turn, that the relative loss in option value is maximised. By contrast, as λ increases, the likelihood
of subsidy provision increases, and, as a result, B( j )0,0,1E
δ1 → 0, and, in turn, F ( j )0,0,1 (E) → A
( j )
1,0,0E
β1 ,
which implies that the relative loss in option value is zero.
INVESTMENT UNDER INFINITE PROVISIONS AND RETRACTIONS
The dynamics of the value of the option to invest under infinite provision and retractions for ζ = 0, 1,
are described in (A–12) and (A–13), respectively.
F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E) = (1 − ρdt)
[
λdtEE
[
F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E + dE)
]
+ (1 − λdt)EE
[
F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E + dE)
] ]
(A–12)
F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) = (1 − ρdt)
[
λdtEE
[
F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E + dE)
]
+ (1 − λdt)EE
[
F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E + dE)
] ]
(A–13)
By expanding the right–hand side of (A–12) and (A–13) using Itô’s lemma, we have
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
( j )′′
0,∞,∞ (E) + µEF
( j )′
0,∞,∞ (E) − (λ + ρ)F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E) + λF
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) = 0 (A–14)
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
( j )′′
1,∞,∞ (E) + µEF
( j )′
1,∞,∞ (E) − (λ + ρ)F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) + λF
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E) = 0 (A–15)
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and by adding and subtracting (A–14) and (A–15) we obtain (A–16) and (A–17), respectively, where
Fa (E) = F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) + F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E) and Fb (E) = F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) − F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E).
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
′′
a
(P) + µEF
′
a
(P) − ρFa (E) = 0 (A–16)
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
′′
b
(P) + µEF
′
b
(P) − (ρ + 2λ)F
b
(E) = 0 (A–17)
The solution to (A–16) and (A–17) can be obtained by setting Fa (E) = A
( j )
a
E
β1 and F
b
(E) = A
( j )
b
E
η .
Thus, we obtain:
F
( j )
1,∞,∞ (E) =
1
2
[
A
( j )
a
E
β1
+ A
( j )
b
E
η
]
(A–18)
F
( j )
0,∞,∞ (E) =
1
2
[
A
( j )
a
E
β1 − A( j )
b
E
η
]
(A–19)
where η is the positive root of the quadratic 12σ
2x(x − 1) + µx − (ρ + 2λ) = 0.
REFERENCES
[1] Adkins, R. and D. Paxson (2015). “Subsidies for renewable energy facilities under uncertainty." The Manchester School.
doi: 10.1111/manc.12093.
[2] Bloomberg (2013). AGL delays Australian wind farm on government policy concern. 11 July.
[3] Blyth, W., R. Bradley, D.W. Bunn, C. Clarke, T. Wilson, and M. Yang (2007). “Investment risks under uncertain climate
change policy." Energy Policy 35(11): 5766–5773.
[4] Boomsma, T.K. and K. Linnerud (2014). “Revision of renewable energy support schemes. The cost of policy uncertainty."
Energy doi:10.1016/j.energy.2015.05.114.
[5] Boomsma, T.K. N. Meade, and S.E. Fleten (2012). “Renewable energy investments under different support schemes: A
real options approach." European Journal of Operational Research 220(1): 225–237.
[6] Bøckman T., S.E. Fleten, E. Juliussen, H.J. Langhammer, and I. Revdal (2008). “Investment timing and optimal capacity
choice for small hydropower projects." European Journal of Operational Research 109(1): 255–267.
[7] Chronopoulos, M., V. Hagspiel, and S.E. Fleten (2014). “Stepwise investment and capacity sizing under uncertainty."
Discussion Paper. Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway.
[8] Chronopoulos, M., D.W. Bunn, and A. Siddiqui (2014). “Optionality and policymaking in re–transforming the British
power market," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 3(2).
[9] Chronopoulos, M., B. De Reyck, and A. Siddiqui (2012). “The value of capacity sizing under risk aversion and operational
flexibility." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 60(2): 272–288.
[10] Coulomb, L. and K. Neuhoff (2012). “Learning curves and changing product attributes: the case of wind turbines."
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0618, University of Cambridge, UK.
[11] Dangl, T. (1999). “Investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand." European Journal of Operational Research
117: 415–428.
[12] Dixit, A.K. and R.S. Pindyck (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA.
[13] Financial Times (2014a). Iberdrola profits hit by Spanish energy reform. 23 July.
[14] Financial Times (2014b). The big drop: cheap oil burns green energy. 17 December.
[15] Gollier, C., D. Proult, F. Thais, and G. Walgenwitz (2005). “Choice of nuclear power investments under price uncertainty:
valuing modularity." Energy Economics 27: 667–685.
[16] Goto, M., R. Takashima, M. Tsujimura, T. Ohno (2008). “Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty in a symmetric
duopoly." In: 12th Annual International Conference on Real Options, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
[17] Huisman, K.J.M. and P.M. Kort (2009). “Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty." CentER Discussion Paper
2013–003, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
[18] IEA (2014). Policy uncertainty threatens to slow renewable energy momentum. 28 August.
[19] Jamasb, T. and J. Ko¨hler (2008). “Learning curves for energy technology: a critical assessment." Delivering a Low
Carbon Electricity System, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Stepwise Green Investment under Policy Uncertainty / 24
[20] Kettunen, J., D.W. Bunn, and W. Blyth (2011). “Investment propensities under carbon policy uncertainty." The Energy
Journal 32(1): 77–118.
[21] Kort, P.M., P. Murto, and P. Grzegorz (2010). “Uncertainty and stepwise investment." European Journal of Operational
Research 202(1): 196–203.
[22] Lemoine, D.M. (2010). “Valuing plug–in hybrid electric vehicles’ battery capacity using a real options framework." The
Energy Journal 31(2): 113–144.
[23] Linnerud, K., A.M. Andersson, and S.E. Fleten (2014). “Investment timing under uncertain renewable energy policy: an
empirical study of small hydropower projects." Energy 78: 154–164.
[24] Majd, S. and R.S. Pindyck (1987). “Time to build, option value, and investment decisions." Journal of Financial
Economics 18: 7–27.
[25] Malchow–Møller, N. and B.J. Thorsen (2005). “Repeated real options: optimal investment behaviour and a good rule of
thumb." Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 29: 1025–1041.
[26] Mun˜oz, J.I. and D.W. Bunn (2013). “Investment risk and return under renewable decarbonization of a power market."
Climate Policy 13: 87–105.
[27] NREL (2012). “IEA wind task 26: the past and future cost of wind energy," Technical Report, May 2012.
[28] Rothwell, G. (2006). “A real options approach to evaluating new nuclear power plants." Energy Journal 27(1): 37–54.
[29] Sensfuß, F., M. Ragwitz, and M. Genoese (2008). “The merit–order effect: a detailed analysis of the price effect of
renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in Germany." Energy Policy 36(8): 3076–3084.
[30] Siddiqui, A.S. and R. Takashima (2013). “Capacity switching options under rivalry and uncertainty." European Journal
of Operational Research 222(3): 583–595.
[31] Siddiqui, A.S., and K.M. Maribu (2009). “Investment and upgrade in distributed generation under uncertainty." Energy
Economics 31(1): 25–37.
[32] The Economist (2011). Sun burned. 26 July.
[33] The Guardian (2015a). How will government subsidy cuts impact the UK’s solar industry? 22 July.
[34] The Guardian (2015b). UK renewable energy industry warns of legal action over subsidies, 1 June.
[35] The Telegraph (2015). Green energy subsidies spiral out of control. 4 July.
[36] The Telegraph (2013). Half of new power plants once due by 2016 now delayed by policy uncertainty, national grid
warns. 21 November.
[37] Walls, W.D., F.W. Rusco, and J. Ludwigson (2007). “Power plant investment in restructured markets." Energy 32(8):
1403–1413.
[38] WindPower Monthly (2012). Portugal extends wind tariff cuts to existing projects. 18 May.
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
